From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and environment in conflict

January 6, 2013, 5:24 pm

Rationale

Environmental factors are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of violent conflict. Ethnicity, adverse economic conditions, low levels of international trade and conflict in neighboring countries are all significantly correlated as well. However, it is clear that the exploitation of natural resources and related environmental stresses can become significant drivers of violence.

Since 1990, at least eighteen violent conflicts have been fueled by the exploitation of natural resources (see table 1).[1] Looking back over the past sixty years, at least forty percent of all intrastate conflicts can be associated with natural resources.[2] Civil wars such as those in Liberia, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo have centered on “highvalue” resources like timber, diamonds, gold, minerals and oil. Other conflicts, including those in Darfur and the Middle East, have involved control of scarce resources such as fertile land and water.

 Table 1: Recent civil wars and internal unrest fuelled by natural resources[3]
 Country  Duration  Resources
 Afghanistan  1978-2001  Gems, timber, opium
 Angola  1975-2002  Oil, diamonds
 Burma  1949-  Timber, tin, gems, opium
 Cambodia  1978-1997  Timber, gems
 Colombia  1984-  Oil, gold, coca, timber, emeralds
 Congo, Dem Rep. of  1996-1998, 1998-2003, 2003-2008  Copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt, timber, tin
 Congo, Rep. of  1997-  Oil
 Côte d’Ivoire  2002-2007  Diamonds, cocoa, cotton
 Indonesia – Aceh  1975-2006  Timber, natural gas
 Indonesia – West Papua  1969-  Copper, gold, timber
 Liberia  1989-2003  Timber, diamonds, iron, palm oil, cocoa, coffee, rubber, gold
 Nepal  1996-2007  Yarsa gumba (fungus)
 PNG – Bougainville  1989-1998  Copper, gold
 Peru  1980-1995  Coca
 Senegal – Casamance  1982-  Timber, cashew nuts
 Sierra Leone  1991-2000  Diamonds, cocoa, coffee
 Somalia  1991-  Fish, charcoal
 Sudan  1983-2005  Oil

As the global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues to grow, there is significant potential for conflicts over natural resources to intensify. Demographic pressure and urbanization, inequitable access to and shortage of land, and resource depletion are widely predicted to worsen, with profound effects on the stability of both rural and urban settings. In addition, the potential consequences of climate change for water availability, food security, the prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries, and population distribution are also increasingly seen as threats to international security, aggravating existing tensions and potentially generating new conflicts.[4]

The relationship between natural resources, the environment and conflict is thus multi-dimensional and complex, but three principal pathways can be drawn:

a) Contributing to the outbreak of conflict: Attempts to control natural resources or grievances caused by inequitable wealth sharing or environmental degradation can contribute to the outbreak of violence. Countries that depend on the export of a narrow set of primary commodities may also be more vulnerable to conflict.

b) Financing and sustaining conflict: Once conflict has broken out, extractive “high-value” resources may be exploited to finance armed forces, or become strategic considerations in gaining territory. In such cases, the duration of conflict is extended by the availability of new sources of financing, or complicated by efforts to gain control over resource-rich areas.

c) Undermining peacemaking: The prospect of a peace agreement may be undermined by individuals or splinter groups that could lose access to the revenues generated by resource exploitation if peace were to prevail. Once a peace agreement is in place, the exploitation of natural resources can also threaten political reintegration and reconciliation by providing economic incentives that reinforce political and social divisions.

Contributing to the outbreak of conflict

Many countries currently face development challenges relating to the unsustainable use of natural resources and the allocation of natural wealth. At a basic level, tensions arise from competing demands for the available supply of natural resources. In some cases, it is a failure in governance (institutions, policies, laws) to resolve these tensions equitably that leads to specific groups being disadvantaged, and ultimately to conflict. In others, the root of the problem lies in the illegal exploitation of resources.

Research and field observation indicate that natural resources and the environment contribute to the outbreak of conflict in three main ways. First, conflicts can occur over the fair apportioning of wealth derived from “highvalue” extractive resources like minerals, metals, stones, hydrocarbons and timber.[5] The local abundance of valuable resources, combined with acute poverty or the lack of opportunity for other forms of income, creates an incentive for groups to attempt to capture them by taking control of resource-rich territories or violently hijacking the state. The potential for “high-value” natural resources to contribute to conflict is a function of global demand and depends largely on their market price

Case study 1: Darfur, Sudan

 

caption Scarce resources, such as water and fertile land, contribute to the conflict in Darfur © UNEP

 

Sudan has been the site of armed conflict and civil unrest for more than half a century. In Darfur, recurrent drought, increasing demographic pressure, and political marginalization are among the forces that have pushed the region into a spiral of lawlessness and violence that has led to over 300,000 deaths and the displacement of more than two million people since 2003.[6]
While the causes of conflict in Darfur are many and complex, UNEP’s environment and conflict analysis found that regional climate variability, water scarcity and the steady loss of fertile land are important underlying factors.[7] The decrease in the availability of fertile land and water has been compounded by the arrival of people displaced from conflict-affected areas in southern Sudan during the civil war.

Overgrazing and deforestation have reduced the vegetation cover, leading to a decrease of topsoil volume and quality. The lack of sheltering trees and vegetation has in turn undermined natural defenses against shifting sands. In addition, the region has experienced a marked decline in rainfall. In northern Darfur, sixteen of the twenty driest years on record have occurred since 1972.[8] With higher population density and growing demand for resources, recurring drought under conditions of near anarchy has fostered violent competition between agriculturalists, nomads and pastoralists in a region where some 75 percent of the population are directly dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods.

With rapidly increasing human and livestock populations,[9] the weaknesses of institutions governing access to land and water have become more apparent, and some groups have been particularly disadvantaged.[10] Desertification and its acute form, drought, do not inevitably lead to conflict. By causing poverty, marginalization and migration however, they create the conditions that make violence an attractive option for disempowered young men. Marginalized pastoralist groups, for example, have been recruited as militias to fight proxy wars where they were able to raid cattle. Nomads, whose camel-herding livelihoods have been hard-hit by drought and desertification, have also been easy prey for armed groups in the region.

As climate change may further compound water and land stresses, Darfur and indeed the entire Sahel region – recently dubbed “ground zero” for climate change[11] – will need to place adaptation at the center of their development and conflict prevention plans. In addition to resolving the long-standing ethnic tensions in Darfur, durable peace will indeed depend on addressing the underlying competition for water and fertile land.

Second, conflicts also occur over the direct use of scarce resources including land, forests, water and wildlife. These ensue when local demand for resources exceeds the available supply or when one form of resource use places pressure on other uses.[12] This can result either from physical scarcity or from governance and distribution factors. Such situations are often compounded by demographic pressures and disasters such as drought and flooding. Unless local institutions or practices mitigate competing interests, these tensions can lead to forced migration or violent conflict at the local level. Case study 1 on Darfur demonstrates how the steady loss of fertile land, coupled with rapidly increasing human and livestock populations, is one of a cluster of stresses that have driven the region to war.

Third, countries whose economies are dependent on the export of a narrow set of primary commodities are more likely to be politically fragile.[13] Not only are their economic fortunes held hostage to the fluctuating price of the commodity on international markets, but it can be difficult for developing countries to add value or generate widespread employment from such exports. Moreover, governments whose revenues are generated from the export of commodities rather than from taxation tend to be alienated from the needs of their constituents. The combination of the problems of currency appreciation and the opaque revenue management and corruption that have developed in many resource-rich countries is known as the “resource curse.”[13]

The common trait in these three situations is the inability of weak states to resolve resource-based tensions peacefully and equitably. Indeed, conflict over natural resources and the environment is largely the reflection of a failure of governance, or a lack of capacity. As demands for resources continue to grow, this conclusion highlights the need for more effective investment in environmental and natural resource governance.

 Case study 2: Sierra Leone and Liberia

 

caption Timber revenues fueled conflict in Liberia. © Corbis

 

In 1991, Liberian warlord Charles Taylor sponsored the invasion of Sierra Leone by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group whose brutal military campaign was characterized by mass amputations and systematic rape.[14] Taylor not only provided material support to the RUF, but also sent his own troops to fight alongside them, both before and after he assumed the Liberian presidency in 1997.[15] Taylor’s support of the RUF was motivated at least in part by his desire to gain control of lucrative Sierra Leonean diamond fields less than 100 miles from the Liberian border. This interest undermined peace in Sierra Leone until 2001, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone later indicted Taylor for participating in a joint criminal enterprise “to take any actions necessary to gain and exercise political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond mining areas.”[16]

In response to the role of the diamond trade in financing Charles Taylor and the RUF, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on diamond exports from Liberia in March 2001. This increased pressure on the RUF, which laid down arms the following year, leaving over 200,000 people dead, more than two million displaced, and thousands maimed.[17] As an unintended side effect of the sanctions, however, Charles Taylor switched to another natural resource – Liberian timber – as his main source of revenue. Reflecting the lack of coherence in the UN’s approach to natural resource-fueled conflicts, it was another two years before sanctions were imposed on Liberian timber exports in July 2003. The following month, with his key funding source cut and rebel groups advancing on Monrovia, Charles Taylor went into exile in Nigeria.

Full appreciation of the role of natural resources in the conflict in Sierra Leone also requires scrutiny of the Sierra Leonean government’s own track record. In the years preceding the RUF insurgency, massive corruption in Sierra Leone’s diamond sector played a more subtle but significant role in setting the stage for complete political collapse. Autocratic ruler Siaka Stevens, who was in power from 1968 to 1985, brought Sierra Leone’s lucrative diamond sector under his personal control, overseeing the wholesale diversion of revenues from the state into the pockets of a few individuals.[18] As diamond-smuggling operations overseen by Stevens’ cronies skyrocketed, official exports dropped from more than two million carats in 1970 to 48,000 carats in 1988.[19] By the end of Stevens’ rule, the Sierra Leonean economy was for all intents and purposes criminalized or destroyed. The situation improved little under the rule of his successor, Joseph Momoh.[20] This looting of the state marginalized large sections of the population, undermined the government’s legitimacy and weakened its capacity to maintain peace and stability. 


 Case study 3: Angola

 

caption Illegal extraction and trafficking of diamonds financed UNITA’s armed struggle in Angola © Corbis

 

The civil war between the government of Angola, dominated by the socialist independence movement Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the anti-colonialist movement União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), originated as a political struggle linked to the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War period however, foreign support for the warring parties began to dry up. When the first multiparty elections in the history of the country were won by the MPLA in 1992, UNITA rejected the results and resumed armed struggle.[21] This move caused UNITA to lose most of its international support, and would probably have undermined its ability to wage war if diamond]s had not sustained its military effort for almost a decade after foreign support was incrementally withdrawn.[22]

From the early 1980s onwards, UNITA established its operations in the diamond-rich north of the country and began earning revenue from taxes on the production of, and trade in, diamonds. Valued at USD 3-4 billion in the period from 1992 to 2000, the importance of the diamond trade for UNITA leadership was such that obtaining the position of Minister of Geology and Mining was a critical objective for UNITA in the 1994 Lusaka Protocol.[23]

In a virtually parallel development, the Angolan government’s war effort was to a large extent dependent on oil revenues. In this respect, the civil war in Angola can be considered “the ultimate natural resource war,”[24] as the course of the conflict broadly followed the price of oil relative to diamonds.

While a telling example of some of the dangers posed by natural resource riches in a country engaged in civil war, the case of Angola also illustrates how natural resource revenues render belligerents vulnerable to outside economic pressures, as UN sanctions on UNITA diamonds undoubtedly sped up the organization’s downfall from the late 1990s onwards. 

Financing and sustaining conflict

Regardless of whether or not natural resources play a causal role in the onset of conflict, they can serve to prolong and sustain violence. In particular, “high-value” resources can be used to generate revenue for financing armed forces and the acquisition of weapons. Capturing such resources becomes a strategic objective for military campaigns, thereby extending their duration.

In the last twenty years, at least eighteen civil wars have been fueled by natural resources (see table 1). Diamonds, timber, minerals and cocoa have been exploited by armed groups from Liberia and Sierra Leone (case study 2), Angola (case study 3) and Cambodia (case study 4). Indeed, the existence of easily captured and exploited natural resources not only makes insurgency economically feasible[25] (and, therefore, war more likely); it may also alter the dynamics of conflict itself by encouraging combatants to direct their activities towards securing the assets that enable them to continue to fight. Thus revenues and riches can alter the mindset of belligerents, transforming war and insurgency into an economic rather than purely political activity, with violence resulting less from grievance than from greed.

 Case study 4: Cambodia

 

caption It is estimated that forest cover in Cambodia decreased from 73% in 1969 to 35% in 1995 © Global Witness

 

In 1979, Vietnam invaded its neighbour Cambodia and overthrew Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime, whose four-year rule had seen around a fifth of the Cambodian population die from starvation, overwork, or execution.[26] The Khmer Rouge regrouped along the Thai border and launched an insurgency that would last for almost two decades.

The civil war between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh was initially about ideology and power, and like Angola, was a proxy for Cold War antagonism. The new Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh was supported financially by the Soviet Union and eastern bloc countries, while China, the United States and Thailand came out against the Vietnamese invasion. China viewed Vietnam’s invasion as an unwelcome extension of Soviet influence and accused Hanoi of attempting to annex Cambodia and “set up an ‘Indochina Federation’ under its control.”[27]

As the end of the Cold War eroded much of the Khmer Rouge’s external support, the group switched its revenue-raising efforts to the exploitation of valuable natural resources under its control, principally timber and rubies. This approach was quickly emulated by Phnom Penh government forces, as political and military leaders on both sides saw an opportunity to prosecute the war while amassing personal fortunes. Logging funded military campaigns, and military campaigns soon became pretexts for more logging, with devastating human and environmental impacts. Studies estimate that the forest cover in Cambodia decreased from 73 percent in 1969 to as low as 30 to 35 percent in 1995[28] from a combination of logging and slash and burn agriculture.

The official policy of Cambodia’s western neighbour, Thailand, was one of non-cooperation with the Khmer Rouge, and the Thai government therefore insisted that timber imported from Cambodia have a certificate of origin obtained from the Phnom Penh authorities. Surprisingly, these certificates were forthcoming, even for timber felled in Khmer Rouge territory. The Cambodian government charged loggers operating in Khmer Rouge zones a flat rate of USD 35 per cubic meter for the provision of these certificates, thus enabling their enemy to raise the funds to pursue their war effort.[29] In the 1995 dry season, overland exports of timber from Khmer Rouge-held territory to Thailand were earning the Khmer Rouge leadership USD 10-20 million per month.[30] This information was used by the NGO Global Witness to lobby successfully for a change in the US Foreign Operations Act, which thereafter stated that US assistance would not be given to any country determined to be cooperating militarily with the Khmer Rouge. The next day, Thailand closed its border with Cambodia to further imports of logs.

The Khmer Rouge regional command, which controlled key forest and mineral reserves in the west of Cambodia, defected to the Phnom Penh government in August 1996. While Pol Pot and his key lieutenants continued to hold territory in the north, they were severely weakened politically and through the loss of earning capacity from natural resources. The movement went on to suffer further defections and, by the end of 1998, had disintegrated completely.

Undermining peacemaking

Economic incentives related to the presence of valuable natural resources can hinder the resolution of conflict and complicate peace efforts. As the prospect of a peace agreement appears closer, individuals or splinter groups who stand to lose access to the revenues gained from resource exploitation can act to spoil peacemaking efforts. Indeed, real or perceived risks of how peace may alter access to and regulation of natural resources in ways that damage some actors’ interests can be a major impediment. At the same time, natural resources can also undermine genuine political reintegration and reconciliation even after a peace agreement is in place, by providing economic incentives that reinforce political divisions (case study 5).

Furthermore, preliminary findings from a retrospective analysis of intrastate conflicts over the past sixty years indicate that conflicts associated with natural resources are twice as likely to relapse into conflict within the first five years.[31]

 Case study 5: Côte d’Ivoire

 

caption The Forces Nouvelles reportedly generated USD 30 million from the cocoa trade in 2006 © Global Witness

 

Côte d’Ivoire was once the economic powerhouse of West Africa – a stable and affluent country that had avoided the descent into civil war that had plagued so many of its neighbors. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was known as the “African miracle.” Yet in September 2002, an army mutiny escalated into a full-scale rebellion, resulting in the country’s split between a rebel-held north and a government-held south. After several failed peace agreements, Côte d’Ivoire remains divided in a military stalemate, with the latest power-sharing agreement signed on 4 March 2007.[32]

Economic agendas on both sides are key to understanding why the conflict has proven so difficult to resolve. In September 2005, investigators discovered that diamonds mined in rebel-held Forces Nouvelles areas were being smuggled into Mali and Guinea and then onto the international market.[33] In November 2005, the UN Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire published a report detailing how the rebels were using diamonds, as well as cocoa and cotton, to fund their war effort, and for personal gain.[34] The economic benefits gained from these natural resources, the Panel found, constituted a major disincentive to negotiate peace. In December 2005, three years after the conflict started, the Security Council extended the arms embargo against Côte d’Ivoire to include a ban on rough diamond exports from the country.[35]

Diamonds, however, were not the only source of revenue that needed to be controlled. With some 40 percent of the world’s cocoa coming from Côte d’Ivoire, the commodity makes up 35 percent of the country’s export earnings.[36] In 2006, an investigation by the British NGO Global Witness uncovered evidence that the Forces Nouvelles were generating approximately USD 30 million per year by levying taxes on the cocoa trade – more than the group’s estimated returns from the diamond trade.[37]

The Ivorian cocoa sector also funds military activity by the government and government-associated militias. Indeed, the majority of cocoa plantations are situated in the government-controlled south of the country. More than USD 58 million in cocoa revenues were used for the government’s war effort through the national cocoa institutions – a series of parasitical bodies mostly set up after President Laurent Gbagbo came to power in 2001.[38]

These economic interests, which benefit both parties to the power-sharing agreement, contribute to a situation in which neither side has an incentive to accelerate reunification. The resulting political foot-dragging is underscored by repeated postponement of presidential elections. While the exploitation of Côte d’Ivoire’s national wealth may form an area of common interest for both sides, it is also clearly stalling genuine political reintegration.

 References

  1. ^ Ross, M. (2004). “The natural resource curse: How wealth can make you poor”. In I. Bannon & P. Collier (Eds.) Natural resources and violent conflict. World Bank. Washington, D.C.
  2. ^ Uppsala Conflict Data Program & Centre for the Study of Civil War. (2008). UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4.0. In Binningsbø, H. & Rustad, S. A. (2008). PRIO working paper: Resource conflicts, resource management and post-conflict peace. Uppsala University & International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
  3. ^ Adapted and updated from Ross, M. (2003). “The natural resource curse: How wealth can make you poor.” In I. Bannon & P. Collier (Eds.) Natural resources and violent conflict. World Bank. Washington, D.C.
  4. ^ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH. (2008). Climate change and security: Challenges for German development cooperation. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany.
  5. ^ Ross, M. (2004). “What do we know about natural resources and civil war?” Journal of Peace Research. 41(3), pp. 337-356.
  6. ^ Holmes, J. (2008). Report to the Security Council on the conditions in Western Sudan. United Nations Security Council. New York.
  7. ^ UN Environment Programme. (2007). Sudan post-conflict environmental assessment. UNEP. Geneva.
  8. ^ Tearfund. (2008). Relief in a vulnerable environment. Tearfund Media. Teddington, UK.
  9. ^ Darfur’s population has grown six-fold since the 1950s. UN Environment Programme. (2007). Sudan postconflict environmental assessment. UNEP. Geneva.
  10. ^ UN Environment Programme. (2007). Sudan post-conflict environmental assessment. UNEP. Geneva.
  11. ^ “Sahel: Region is ‘ground zero’ for climate change.” (2008, 2 June). Integrated Regional Information Networks. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Geneva.
  12. ^ These conflicts are mostly too local and small-scale to be included in conflict datasets. UNEP found 41 smallscale conflicts over natural resources such as water in the Darfur region 1930 to 2000. UN Environment Programme. (2007). Sudan post-conflict environmental assessment. UNEP. Geneva.
  13. ^ For an introduction to the extensive literature on this subject see: Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
  14. ^ “In Depth: Our bodies – their battleground: Gender-based violence in conflict zones.” (2004, September). Integrated Regional Information Networks. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Geneva.
  15. ^ UN Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and Arms. (2000, December). Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone. United Nations Security Council. New York.
  16. ^ The indictment of Charles Taylor, dated March 2003, was reduced from 17 to 11 counts on 16 March 2006.
  17. ^ Global Witness. (2006). The sinews of war. Global Witness Publishing. Washington, D.C.
  18. ^ Reno, W. (1999). Warlord politics and African states. Lynne Riener Publishers. Boulder.
  19. ^ Smillie, I., Gberie, L. & Hazleton, R. (2000). The heart of the matter: Sierra Leone, diamonds and human security. Partnership Africa Canada. Ottawa.
  20. ^ Gberie, L. (2005). A dirty war in West Africa. Indiana University Press. Bloomington.
  21. ^ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University. (2008). UCDP conflict termination dataset v.2.1: 1946-2007. Retrieved July 2008 from Uppsala University: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm
  22. ^ Le Billon, P. (2001). “Angola’s political economy of war.” African Affairs. No.100, pp. 55-80.
  23. ^ Ibid.
  24. ^ Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
  25. ^ Collier, P. (2000). Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy. World Bank. Washington, D.C.
  26. ^ Yale Cambodian Genocide Program, Yale University. (2008). Cambodian Genocide Databases. Retrieved July 2008 from Yale University: http://www.yale.edu/cgp/databases.html
  27. ^ Gottesman, E. (2002). Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the politics of nation building. Yale University Press. New Haven.
  28. ^ Bottomley, R. (2000). Structural analysis of deforestation in Cambodia (with a focus on Ratanakiri Province, Northern Cambodia). Mekong Watch & Institute for Global Environmental Strategies. Tokyo.
  29. ^ Global Witness. (1996). The Khmer Rouge and the funding of the civil war. Global Witness Publishing. Washington, D.C.
  30. ^ Ibid.
  31. ^ Uppsala Conflict Data Program & Centre for the Study of Civil War. (2008). UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4.0. In Binningsbø, H. & Rustad, S. A. (2008). PRIO working paper: Resource conflicts, resource management and post-conflict peace. Uppsala University & International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
  32. ^ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University. (2008). UCDP Conflict Termination dataset v.2.1: 1946-2007. Retrieved July 2008 from Uppsala University: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm
  33. ^ Global Witness. (2005). Making it work: Why the Kimberley Process must do more to stop conflict diamonds. Global Witness Publishing. Washington, D.C.
  34. ^ UN Security Council Group of Experts. (2005, November 7). Report of the Group of Experts submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 1584 concerning Côte d’Ivoire. United Nations Security Council. New York.
  35. ^ UN Security Council. (2005). Resolution 1643: The situation in Côte d’Ivoire. United Nations Security Council. New York.
  36. ^ Global Witness. (2007). Hot chocolate: How cocoa fueled the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Global Witness Publishing. Washington, D.C.
  37. ^ Ibid.
  38. ^ Ibid.

 

Disclaimer: This article is taken wholly from, or contains information that was originally published by, the United Nations Environment Programme. Topic editors and authors for the Encyclopedia of Earth may have edited its content or added new information. The use of information from the United Nations Environment Programme should not be construed as support for or endorsement by that organization for any new information added by EoE personnel, or for any editing of the original content.

 

 

 


This is a chapter from From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (report).
Previous: Introduction  |  Table of Contents  |  Next: Impacts of conflict on natural resources and the environment
 

 

Glossary

Citation

Programme, U. (2013). From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and environment in conflict. Retrieved from http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/152883

0 Comments

To add a comment, please Log In.